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Clear Text
system design. I’m not going to talk
about whether Guttmann’s analysis
is correct in every detail or not
(though I’ve known him several
years and have a great deal of respect
for him), and I’m certainly not going
to wade into the digital rights man-
agement (DRM) wars now. Instead,
I’m going to focus on complexity
and security.
It’s a truism that complex sys-
tems are less secure than simple
ones. In some sense, this is in-
evitable because they contain more
code that can be buggy. Worse,
complexity (and hence potential
incorrectness) increases more than
linearly with the program’s size. But
it’s not that simple—a certain
amount of code is necessary for se-
curity. For example, an OS that
didn’t check passwords would have
less code than one that did, but it
would clearly be less secure. More
realistically, code to perform array
bounds checking is an important
defense against buffer-overflow at-
tacks, but it’s also more code.
The real issue is with increased
interaction among different pieces
of code, which is the real danger
with DRM. The DRM problem is
very hard; attackers can try to re-
cover content at many different
points. Thus, as Guttmann’s article
points out, a video card has to know
that it’s displaying protected con-
tent and shut down outputs that talk
to unprotected monitors. This
communication path doesn’t need
to exist in the absence of DRM; the
obvious question is whether it poses
any new security problems, such as
whether or not the new code has
any buffer overflows. More subtly,
we might wonder if an attack pro-
gram can somehow assert to the
system that it’s processing protected
content, thereby forcing the system
to turn off the display. What if a
Web page includes a URL that
points to a protected but silent
“song”? While this song is “play-
ing,” other functionality will be dis-
abled. Some such mechanisms must
exist if the ability to download pro-
tected content is to be preserved;
the only question is how to guard
against abuse.
Another threat comes from a set
of measures designed to protect
against weak—that is, buggy—de-
vice drivers. The ability will exist to
“revoke” them. But again, how is
this ability protected? The obvious
solution is for the revocation mes-
sage to be digitally signed; I think we
can safely assume that this is the ap-
proach taken. However, is the code
correct? Is the process that autho-
rizes driver revocation correct? Re-
member the fraudulently obtained
Microsoft code-signing certificates
in 2001? Could something like that
happen again?
I’m not, of course, asserting that
any of these security holes actually
exist. Microsoft has made great
strides in securing its software, and
I’m sure it has put a lot of effort into
testing all the new DRM code. But
as we all know, testing is dicey.
Edsger Dijkstra once noted that
“program testing can be a very effec-
tive way to show the presence of
bugs, but is hopelessly inadequate for
showing their absence.” A lot of new
mechanisms have been introduced;
more seriously, a lot of new commu-
nications paths and dependencies
have been introduced. Worst of all,
these paths and mechanisms are solv-
ing a new problem, one with which
the profession has very little experi-
ence. Did Microsoft get it right?
D RM may not be evil. It is, how-ever, very, very complex, and,
historically, complexity has led to in-
security. When contemplating such
steps, we should bear in mind
Dijkstra’s dictum, one taken from his
Turing Award lecture: “We shall do a
much better programming job, pro-
vided that we approach the task with
a full appreciation of its tremendous
difficulty ... and approach the task as
Very Humble Programmers.” 
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eter Gutmann recently posted an essay entitled “A
Cost Analysis of Windows Vista Content Protec-
tion” on the Web (www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut
001/pubs/vista_cost.txt). It’s a fascinating summary
of the implications of Vista’s content protection mechanisms on
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